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Introduction: 
 
The summer of 1966 was abnormally hot for Cleveland, Ohio.  The average 
temperature in July was twenty-seven degrees Celsius, and there had been eighteen 
consecutive days of zero precipitation.1 Mirroring the temperatures outside, the tensions 
inside the Seventy-Niner’s Café were running high on 18 July.  Owned by Jewish 
brothers, Dave and Abe Feigenbaum, the Seventy-Niner’s Café was located at the corner 
of Hough Avenue and 79th Street in the Hough neighborhood. Stretching from East 55th 
to 105th between Superior and Euclid Avenues, Hough was only two square miles. The 
Seventy-Niner’s Café was not only the geographical center of the predominately, black 
neighborhood but also the center of the riots that would ravage the poorest, most 
overcrowded section of the city from 18 July until 23 July 23, 1966. 2  
While the relationship between local blacks and whites in Hough had been 
strained for a long time, it had not reached such violent proportions until the summer of 
1966.  At the end of June, there had been skirmishes between members of the majority 
white Cleveland Police Department and young, black teenagers in the adjacent 
neighborhood. On the evening of 18 July, an African-American man walked into the 
Seventy-Niner’s Café and ordered a bottle of wine to go and a cup of ice water. The 
Feigenbaums later told reporters that this black man was like all the other cheap, 
alcoholic denizens of their bar who tried to violate the Ohio law which prohibited carry-
out wine to be consumed on the premises of the café: ‘The wine-heads dump the water 
and pour the wine into the glass. It’s cheaper than buying a straight glass of wine.’ 3 
Enraged by the Feigenbaum’s poor treatment, the black customer left and posted a sign 
outside the bar that said, ‘No Water for Niggers.’4 Rumors of the sign quickly spread 
throughout the neighborhood, and a large crowd began to congregate outside the bar. The 
crowd became increasingly agitated as the night wore on, and the Feigenbaums decided 
to call the police. The police arrived after some delay yet failed to disperse the crowd. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  ‘Second Cool Mark is Set as Cleveland Stays Dry,’ The Cleveland Press (22 July, 
1966).  
2 Marc Lackwritz, ‘The Hough Riots of 1966,’ (Senior Thesis, Princeton University, 
1968), p. 7.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Lackwritz, ‘Hough Riots,’ p. 7.  
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The presence of the unpopular local authority only further excited the crowd, and the riot 
ensued.5 (See Appendix A). 
The mob outside the café began to wreak havoc on the neighborhood into the 
early hours of 19 July. The newspapers reported that the rioters’ main targets were stores, 
apartment buildings, and police officers.6 After one night of chaos in Hough, Ohio 
Governor James A. Rhodes, Cleveland Mayor Ralph Locher and Chief of Police Richard 
Wagner decided to call over 2000 members of the National Guard to help contain the 
situation to no avail.7 The riots continued for five consecutive nights, and caused 
irreparable damage to the neighborhood and its citizens. Four Hough citizens died during 
the riots, none of whom were participating in the violence.  Bullets in the exchange 
between ‘random snipers’ and police hit Joyce Arnett and Percy Giles. White vigilantes 
killed Sam Winchester and Benoris Toney in drive-by shootings. 8 
Before the National Guard left the neighborhood, the City of Cleveland wanted to 
discern who was behind the riots in the Hough. The Special Grand Jury Report Relating 
to the Hough Riots, chaired by the former editor of the Cleveland Press, Louis B. Seltzer, 
blamed the riots solely on ‘black power apostle(s):’ African-Americans whom the jury 
thought were ‘avowed believers in violence and extremism.’ 9 The report specifically 
named clubs in Hough that espoused the ideology of ‘black nationalism,’ and outside 
agitators for inciting the riots.10 Furthermore, the report said that the rate of reform was 
moving too fast for the Hough community to bear.11 The Grand Jury lauded the 
Cleveland Police Department and the National Guard for their actions during the 
weeklong riots. Mayor Ralph Locher praised the Grand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘Owner’s Deny Ice Water Story: Charge That Police Refused to Help,’ The Plain 
Dealer (23 July, 1966).  
6 ‘Locher Doubts State Troops Needed Now,’ The Cleveland Press (19 July, 1966).  
7 Lackwritz, ‘Hough Riots,’ p. 16. 
8 Ibid, pp.7-16.  
9 Special Grand Jury Report Relating to the Hough Riots (Cleveland, 1966), pp. 3-8.  
10 Ibid, p. 7.  
11 Ibid, pp. 1-11. 
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Jury Report for its findings, and the jurors for their bravery in acknowledging the real 
perpetrators behind the violence.12  
Local Civil Rights leaders and the citizens of Hough were dissatisfied with the 
Grand Jury Report, and decided to hold their own hearings and to issue a report on the 
causes of the riots: The Report of the Panel on the Superior and Hough Disturbances by 
the Urban League of Cleveland.  One of the main dissenting voices of the Grand Jury 
Report was State Representative Carl Stokes. He referred to the Grand Jury Report as a 
‘whitewash,’ and a classic attempt of the city’s government to avoid taking responsibility 
for their role in the deterioration of the neighborhood.13 In contrast, the Urban League 
Report cited the horrible conditions in the neighborhood as the underlying reason why a 
segment of the neighborhood rioted.14 The Urban League Report detailed problems with 
dilapidated housing, an inoperative University-Euclid Renewal Plan, high unemployment 
rates, an inadequate welfare system, and the discriminatory attitudes of white police 
officers and white shop owners who ran businesses in the neighborhood.15 Furthermore, 
the Urban League’s Report stressed that the citizens of Hough had attempted to register 
their grievances and suggestions with the city government through local civic 
organizations. The citizen’s efforts had been responded to with either indifference or 
promises that remained unfulfilled by the Locher administration. 16 Further frustrating the 
citizens of Hough was the fact that the Urban League Report had no legal standing to 
ensure reforms in the neighborhood. 17 
Hough, however, was not the only neighborhood to explode during the 1960’s. 
From Los Angeles to New York, northern ghettos were rioting during the summers of 
1965 until 1967. The recurring phenomena, which first started in the Watts neighborhood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ‘Whitewash, Says Stokes: Jury Hough Report Praised, Belittled,’ The Plain Dealer (11 
August, 1966). 
13 Ibid.    
14 Report of the Panel on the Superior and Hough Disturbances by the Urban League of 
Cleveland (Cleveland, 1966), p. 5. 
15 Ibid, pp.5-14. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid, p.17. 
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of Los Angeles in 1965, was coined the ‘long, hot summers’ by journalists. 18 The ‘long, 
hot summers’ had crucial commonalities. First, tensions were high in each ghetto; one 
rumor was sufficient to incite individuals to riot. Second, the rioters had carefully chosen 
targets: prejudiced police officers and discriminatory shopkeepers. Finally, the 
contemporary reaction to the riots varied based on political persuasion. 19  There were two 
major riot reports produced during the decade, which historians use to represent the 
opposing reactions to these summers of turmoil.20 The first major report on the riots was 
Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning?: A Report by the Governor's Commission 
on the Los Angeles Riots, 1965, also referred to as the Watts Commission. Similar to 
Cleveland’s Grand Jury Report, the conservative Watts Commission believed that 
degenerates from outside of Los Angeles had agitated the 1965 riots. Even though the 
1967 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders focused on the entire  ‘long, hot 
summer’ phenomena, the findings of the commission are comparable with the Urban 
League’s findings. The National Advisory Report countered the Watts Commission with 
a liberal indictment of deeply rooted racism in America as the main cause of urban 
violence.21  The different conclusions about the riots reached by these reports illustrate 
the difficulty of making sense out of a chaotic situation.  
 Interpretations of the race riots are as varied today as they were in the 1960’s. The 
‘long, hot summers’ are often depicted as a decisive moment in the declension narrative 
of the American Civil Rights Movement. 22  An example of ‘public memory,’ the 
narrative draws heavily on the very stories, events and personalities that prevailed in the 
media accounts of the period.23 With a sole focus on black organizing activities in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the 
North (New York, 2009), pp. 313-356. 
19 Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992 (New York, 1981), pp. 
188-189. 
20 Hugh Davis Graham, ‘On Riots and Riot Commissions: Civil Disorders,’ The Public 
Historian, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1980), pp. 7-27.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Peniel E. Joseph, ‘The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field,’ The Journal of 
American History, Vol. 96, No. 3 (2009), pp. 751-776.  
23 Edward P. Morgan, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Forgotten: Media Culture and Public 
Memory of the Civil Rights Movement’ in Renee C. Romano (eds.) and Leigh Raiford 
(eds.), The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory (Georgia, 2006), p. 139.   
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South, the declension narrative is the most popular lens used to recount the Civil Rights 
Movement. By emphasizing the activities of groups like Reverend Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the narrative implies that 
the struggle for black equality only consisted of nonviolent protests in the segregated 
South. The declension narrative dates the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement with 
the passage of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 and its ending with the Watts Riots 
in 1965.  Watts and other mid-decade race riots are used to represent the decline of the 
Civil Rights Movement, and the beginning of Black Power advocacy.24 The ‘long, hot 
summers’ effectively splintered the fragile coalition between the major Civil Rights 
groups as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) broke away from the 
dogma of SCLC and embraced Black Power ideology in 1966.25 Poor blacks living in the 
ghetto were too busy surviving to effectively organize against their oppression in a 
nonviolent fashion.26  The violence was reflective of the ghetto residents’ low socio-
economic stature. The declension narrative argues that the riots led to the emergence of 
Black Power, which was the only form of activism in the North. 27 Proponents of the 
narrative considered the Black Power and the Civil Rights Movements to be dialectic 
ideologies.  While the former espoused revolutionary violence, the latter espoused 
peaceful integration. The dichotomy in the declension narrative is clear: the riots and 
Black Power Movement were a negative contrast to nonviolent protest and the Civil 
Rights Movement. 28 
This dissertation aims to disprove the declension narrative’s interpretation of the 
‘long, hot summers’ by specifically examining the Hough riots. Historiographical trends 
demonstrate that the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements were not separate, 
sequenced periods, delineated by the riots into two, distinct ideologies.29  Existing in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Jeanne Theoharis, ‘Alabama on Avalon: Rethinking the Watts Uprising and the 
Character of Black Protest in Los Angeles,’ in Peniel E. Joseph (ed.), The Black Power 
Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era (New York, 2006), p. 29.  
25 Steven F. Lawson, ‘Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography of the Civil 
Rights Movement,’ The American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 2 (1991), pp. 456-471. 
26 Theoharis, ‘Alabama on Avalon,’ pp.29-30.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29Ibid.  
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North before the riots, both movements were more complex than the narratives’ 
moralistic binary. The Civil Rights Movement sought to restore to African-Americans the 
rights of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments through 
legislative change. In its most essential form, the Black Power Movement called for the 
independent development of political and social institutions for black people and 
emphasized pride in black culture.30 The Civil Rights and Black Power Movements were 
two different approaches to the amelioration of the black condition in America.31 This 
dissertation will argue that the Hough riots, including its cause and aftermath, were at the 
intersection of both these strategies.  
The first chapter will analyze the failure of Cleveland’s black political organizing 
scene to engender reforms to improve the conditions in Hough prior to the riots. Their 
failure to instigate reform was not for lack of trying, but rather the result of an 
unresponsive municipal government under the administration of Mayor Locher. The 
second chapter will compare the Grand Jury and Urban League Reports to show how 
violence was used as a currency to draw attention to the sources of black frustration in 
Hough. The riot’s messaging, however, was ineffective in changing the apathetic 
sentiments of the Locher administration.  The third chapter will examine the role the 
Hough riots played in Cleveland’s 1967 mayoral election. The aftermath of the riots 
demonstrated to Cleveland’s black community that the only way to improve the 
conditions in Hough was for black issues to become a priority in City Hall.  This 
dissertation aims to prove that while the ultimate aim of the riots was to spur reform that 
would help improve the conditions in Hough, the tactics used to achieve this goal drew 
from both the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements.  A culmination of a thwarted 
political process, the Hough riots were an articulate form of expression to garner the 
public’s attention about the conditions in the neighborhood; however, the Locher 
administration’s response to the riots demonstrated to blacks that the only way to achieve 
reform in Hough was through self-determination. Hence, the Hough riots becomes an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Rafael Torrubia, Culture from the midnight hour : a critical reassessment of the black 
power movement in twentieth century America, 23 June 2011, < http://research-
repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/1884>  
31 Theoharis, ‘Alabama on Avalon,’ pp.29-30. 	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exemplary case study in indicating the declension narrative’s flawed interpretation of 
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          Chapter 1: A Thwarted Political Process 
 
‘Promise a lot; deliver a little. Lead people to believe they will be much 
better off, but let there be no dramatic improvement.’32 
 
Cleveland’s black political organizing community was unable to improve the 
conditions in Hough through nonviolent actions prior to the 1966 riots. Their failure to 
instigate reform was not for lack of trying but rather the result of an unresponsive 
municipal government. An analysis of the conditions illustrates why citizens in Hough 
were protesting. The rapid demographic and socio-economic changes that took place in 
Hough during the 1950’s prompted many studies of the neighborhood such as Western 
Reserve University’s 1959 Hough, Cleveland Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change, 
and the 1966 United States Civil Rights Commission. The Civil Rights Commission 
diagnosed Hough’s ills to be ‘the classic ones of the ghetto: inadequate housing, schools 
and jobs.’ 33  The Hough ghetto was created and perpetuated by the persistent 
discrimination of the post-World War II period.34 While life in Hough was far from the 
well-advertised American dream, the residents of the neighborhood were attempting to 
improve the conditions in Hough. Cleveland had a vibrant black activism scene 
comprised of groups that existed before the riots.35 From the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE) to the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), these ideologically diverse 
groups worked together in an attempt to enforce housing codes, improve local schools, 
increase welfare funding and end job discrimination in Hough. Despite the activist’s 
efforts, Mayor Ralph M. Locher was not swayed.  Locher did not understand the plight of 
Hough citizens.36 He continually made promises about urban renewal in Hough that his 
administration failed to uphold. The mayor failed to even acknowledge criticism about 
the police department and instances of police brutality against blacks.37 While the riots 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 John S. Adams, ‘The Geography of Riots and Civil Disorders in the 1960s,’ Economic 
Geography Vol. 48, No.1 (1972), pp.24-42. 
33 United States Commission on Civil Rights (Cleveland, 1966), pp. 645-648. 
34 Thomas Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 
(Princeton, 1996), pp. 259-273.  
35 Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, p. 315. 
36 Lackwritz, ‘Hough Riots,’ pp. 45-47.  
37 Ibid.  
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may have started after an incident at a bar, the mob’s outburst stemmed from a deep-
seated frustration over the slow rate of reform that had failed to improve the conditions in 
Hough.38 Ultimately, the Hough riots were the culmination of a thwarted political 
process. 
An Analysis of the Conditions in Hough:  
The conditions in Hough during the 1966 riots were a result of demographic shifts 
that occurred during the previous decade.39 Hough went from being a middle-class, white 
neighborhood to a black ghetto in less than ten years.40 This shift was a combination of 
the Great Migration and white flight to the suburbs.41 Cleveland was one of the most 
popular destinations of the Great Migration, a term used to describe the mass, black 
exodus from the Jim Crow South to the legally desegregated North from 1910 until 1970. 
The African-American population in Cleveland went from being 8,000 in 1910 to 
275,000 in 1960.42 Cleveland had a higher proportion of blacks born in the South than in 
any other Northern city, at 48% in 1960.43  In spite of being in the legally desegregated 
North, Cleveland shared some striking similarities with the South. Charles Perry, co-
founder of Cleveland’s preeminent black insurance agency, the Pinkney-Perry Insurance 
Agency, described the pervasive nature of segregation in the region before the riots: ‘It 
was James Crow in the North.’44 Cleveland was the second most segregated-city in 
America in 1966.45 90% of blacks lived in predominately black neighborhoods.46 Cedar-
Central, the oldest African-American ward in the city, became overcrowded during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, pp. 259-273. 
39 Joseph Boskin, ‘The Revolt of the Urban Ghettos, 1964-1967,’ Annals of The 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 382 (1969), pp. 1-14. 
40 Hough, Cleveland Ohio: A Study of Social Life and Change (Cleveland, 1959), p. 5.  
41 Sudhir Venkatesh, American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto (Boston, 
2002), p. 9.  
42 Karl E. Taeuber, ‘The Problem of Residential Segregation, ‘Proceedings of the 
Academy of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1968), pp.101-110.   
43 Commission on Civil Rights, p. 646. 
44 Perry Interview (14 August, 2014). 
45 Claudia J. Coulton and Julian Chow, ‘The Impact of Poverty on Cleveland 
Neighborhoods,’ in Dennis W. Keating, Norman Krumholz, and David C.  Perry (eds.), 
Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader (Kent, 1995), p. 211.   
46 Commission on Civil Rights, p. 873.  
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World War II as more Southern blacks came to Cleveland to help the war effort.47 Blacks 
were able to leave the overcrowded Cedar-Central and move into neighborhoods like 
Hough as whites began to leave the city during the post-World War II period.  From 1950 
to 1960, Cleveland lost almost 39,000 residents as a result of white flight to the suburbs.48 
The non-white population in Hough went from being 1% percent in 1940 to around 60% 
in 1960 to almost 90% in 1966. 49 The demographic shift resulted in a drastic socio-
economic change that would determine the fate of Hough in the next decade.  
The African-Americans living in the newly formed Hough ghetto during the 
1960’s were trapped in a cycle of poverty that reinforced patterns of racial inequality. Job 
and housing discrimination created the conditions in Hough.50 Blacks had less disposable 
income because they were confined to the most unsecure jobs. 51  Financial viability was 
a major obstacle to secure housing.52  The median family income in Hough at the time of 
the riots was $4,050, which was  $2,945 less than the median family income in the rest of 
the city. 50% of the neighborhood’s residents worked in the semi-skilled trades, which 
were the lowest paid jobs and most susceptible to layoffs.53 The unemployment rate in 
Hough was 6.3% in 1966 while the rest of Cleveland only had an unemployment rate of 
5.5%. Hough contained 25% of all the welfare cases in the city.54 African-Americans had 
difficulty securing accommodations in Cleveland’s housing projects. Despite city 
ordinances that desegregated public housing, the local housing officials segregated 
housing projects.55 There were almost no white families on the waiting list for public 
housing. Nonetheless, blacks on the list were not offered a place to live in unoccupied, 
units in predominately white-buildings. Blacks were essentially barred from the private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Todd M. Michney, ‘Constrained Communities: Black Cleveland’s Experience With 
World War II Public Housing,’ Journal of Social History, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2007), pp. 933-
956.  
48 Carol Poh Miller and Robert A. Wheeler, ‘Cleveland: The Making and Remaking of an 
American City, 1796-1993’ in Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader, p. 43. 
49 A Study of Social Life and Change, p. 5. 
50 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, pp. 259-273. 
51Ibid, pp. 33-57.  
52Ibid, pp. 33-57.  
53 Yong Hyo Cho, ‘City Politics and Racial Polarization: Bloc Voting in Cleveland 
Elections,’ Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1974), pp. 396-417.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Commission on Civil Rights, pp. 697-701. 
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mortgage loan market by banks and brokers.56 The rental market was small and expensive 
but was the last resort for many citizens in Hough. Residents did not have the necessary 
funds to move out of Hough or secure loans to improve the deteriorating housing stock.57  
The low number and poor quality of homes in Hough furthered blight and 
encouraged exploitative practices. There were not enough houses in the neighborhood to 
match the influx of migrants. Only two new houses had been built in Hough since World 
War II. 82% of the residential structures in Hough were over 50 years old.58 Existing 
non-residential buildings were made into homes, and single-family homes were made 
into multiple-family properties to house Hough’s ever-growing population. 21.2% of the 
housing in Hough was considered overcrowded.59 In the 1960’s, there were about forty-
five persons per acre in Hough compared to the range of ten to thirty-five persons per 
acre in other parts of the city.60 When the University-Euclid Plan displaced low-income 
African-Americans from other parts of the city, they often moved to Hough. From 1962 
to 1965, the city displaced nearly 4,500 families without helping them find new 
accommodations.61 Absentee landlords in Hough neglected their properties, and exploited 
the blacks desperate for housing by overcharging them to live in dilapidated housing 
stock. 40% of the housing in Hough was considered deteriorated or dilapidated by the 
government.62 1,300 black families in Hough could only afford rents of $60 to $70 a 
month but were paying as much as $100 a month.63 Landlords knew they could exploit 
the blacks desperate for housing, because African-Americans had very few alternatives.  
The racial and socio-economic composition of Hough was also reflected in the 
local school system. Housing policy reinforced the existing pattern of school segregation 
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and furthered the cycle of poverty.64 All of the twenty-five new schools completed 
between 1952 and 1966 in Cleveland were de-facto segregated. 65 Blacks received an 
inferior education in comparison to their white counterparts. The gap became evident 
between black and white Kindergarteners only after six months of school.66 The youth 
population in Hough had increased an average of 10% every year since 1950, and there 
were not enough elementary schools to match this baby boom.67   Dunham Elementary 
School, Hough’s primary school, tried to accommodate the population growth by 
building portable classrooms in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Eventually, students at Dunham 
had to attend school in half-day shifts due to overcrowding. These conditions adversely 
affected the education and job prospects of Hough’s youth. 68 The youth unemployment 
rate in Hough was 77%.69 Inferior education confined black youths to the bottom of the 
socio-economic system.70 Instead of accepting their situation, the residents of Hough 
actively fought to improve the conditions in their neighborhood so that the future 
generations would not be committed to the same cycle of poverty.  
Black Political Activism in Cleveland:  
The rampant discrimination and segregation in Cleveland galvanized a crucible of 
nonviolent, black activism before the riots. With a focus on the national campaigns of the 
major Civil Rights groups like SNCC and SCLC, the declension narrative does not 
provide an accurate account of black political activism in the post-World War II period. 
The organizing activities of various local groups reveal the multi-faceted nature of the 
black struggle for equal rights. 71 Black groups from the entire political spectrum were 
committed to engendering reform in Hough despite ideological differences. Before 
Hough became a black ghetto or the nonviolence espoused by King became popular, 	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blacks in Cleveland were fighting to improve their socio-economic stature. The Future 
Outlook League was founded in Cleveland in 1935 to help blacks in the Cedar-Central 
area find jobs. The organization was active in Hough in the 1960’s, but its strategies 
could not easily be labeled as either black nationalist or integrationist.72 A predecessor to 
the Black Panther Party, RAM was first convened in Cleveland in 1961. While this black 
militant organization wanted to overthrow the imperialist system imposed by the 
government, RAM worked with local Civil Rights groups to raise awareness about issues 
like police brutality. 73 Cleveland had a vibrant CORE chapter. CORE organized many 
rent strikes in Hough. These rent strikes were an effort to get the municipal government 
to better enforce the housing code, which would bring an end to the exploitative practices 
of Hough’s absentee landlords.  Cleveland was one of the nation’s first centers of open 
housing activism. 74 
The fight over segregated education, persistent workplace discrimination and 
poverty was not only championed by local political organizations but also by the efforts 
of individual Hough citizens. 75  Two mothers from Hough organized the school 
desegregation campaign of 1964. Daisy Craggett and Fanny Louis organized the 
campaign to demand an end to relay schooling, using protest techniques such as picketing 
and boycotts to raise awareness about the conditions in Hough’s public schools. 76 In 
1966, Cleveland was the first city in America where black contractors formed an 
association to combat workplace discrimination. The heads of the black contractors’ 
union were from Hough. 77  Hough residents partook in an organized, nonviolent march 
from Cleveland to the state capitol in Columbus to secure more welfare relief from 
Governor James A. Rhodes. 78 Hough residents formed a group called Citizens for Better 
Housing that wrote letters to the mayor voicing their frustration with the rate of urban 
renewal.79 Despite their best efforts, these activists failed to instigate any legislation or 	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reforms that would end job discrimination, improve the conditions in Hough’s public 
schools or increase welfare funding.  
The Locher Administration:  
Evidenced by the strained relationship between Mayor Locher and the Hough 
community, a riot is more likely to occur when citizens feel alienated from their local 
government.80 Locher became Mayor in late 1962, when racial tensions were already 
simmering in Cleveland. By 1963, the school desegregation crisis was escalating, and the 
conditions in Hough were well known throughout the city. Mr. Perry summarized how 
people in Hough felt about Mayor Locher: ‘He was an old-Romanian man from Slavic 
village. He didn’t know anything about black people or what was going on in Hough.’81 
During his testimony in front of the Civil Rights Commission, Mayor Locher said that the 
Southern migrants ‘had to be taught to become useful, contributing members of the 
community.’ 82  He implied that Hough citizens were partially responsible for the 
conditions in the neighborhood because of their lackadaisical nature: ‘Our history shows, 
I believe, that where there has been a deep concern and commitment by citizens, there 
has been great success and improvement in total living.’ 83  Locher’s sweeping 
generalizations demonstrated how little he understood the discrimination faced by the 
residents of Hough and their political activity.  
Locher’s attitude toward the African-American community, coupled with 
instances of negligence by the Cleveland police, further exacerbated the tensions between 
Hough and City Hall. A group of Hough residents and Civil Rights leaders went to the 
Mayor’s office a few days before the riots.84 The group wanted to air their grievances 
about the police mishandling of the Superior-Sowinski skirmishes in June of 1966. A 
white man had shot a young, black boy, and the police failed to write down the 
bystander’s description of the shooter. The group also wanted to talk about Chief of 
Police Richard Wagner, who had a history of making racially charged comments. Locher 
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refused to meet with them and threatened to put the group in jail when they refused to 
leave his office. 85 While Locher wanted peace, he refused to engage with the necessary 
parties to prevent disorder in Hough.  
Evidenced by the slow rate of reform, the Locher Administration was ineffective 
in combatting the conditions in Hough. One local politician described Locher’s 
leadership style as being nothing more than ‘a long list of studies, plans and broken 
promises.’ 86  The University-Euclid Plan intended to revitalize Hough and renew 
investment in the neighborhood. The project promised to build three major shopping 
centers, high–rise apartments, and new land for industrial expansion in 1962.87 The city 
only deemed half of the neighborhood fit for renewal. The other half, from 55th to 79th 
and from Superior to Chester Avenues, was considered unfit for renewal because 40% of 
the housing stock in this section of Hough was either deteriorated or dilapidated. This 
was the poorest section of Hough, which would have benefited the most from renewal– 
30% of the families in this section earned less than $3000 a year.88 By 1966, no new 
homes had been built in Hough because the University-Euclid Project lacked the 
adequate staff. 89  The sluggish pace of renewal discouraged property owners from 
investing in Hough.  One real estate agent described the unfavorable conditions: ‘The 
area is just dead as far as real estate goes. No one is buying. No one is fixing up 
properties to encourage others. Everyone seems to be just sitting, watching their 
investments slide to nothing.’ 90 Because of the University-Euclid Plan’s nonfulfillment, 
Cleveland lost a federal grant to build more recreational facilities in July of 1966. 91 The 
Locher administration failed to uphold their promises to revitalize the neighborhood, and 
the residents of Hough were forced to live with the repercussions.  
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Source Analysis: 
While providing excellent statistical analysis, each primary source reaches 
different conclusions about the conditions in Hough. The interpretations are reflective of 
each report’s individual purpose and staff. The 1957 Western Reserve Study was 
commissioned in conjunction with the Cleveland Foundation in an effort to provide more 
funding for welfare programs in Hough.92 Richard Wagner, who would later be the Chief 
of Police during the riots, was a member of the advisory board that stated that Hough’s 
new black migrants ‘brought with them from the South the racial attitudes which are 
characteristic in that part of the country.’93 While segregation may have been legalized in 
the South, racism existed in the North before the onslaught of the Great Migration.  The 
United States Civil Rights Commission was first created in 1957 to address civil rights 
violations across the country.94 The 1966 Civil Rights Commissions’ hearings held in 
Cleveland were more cognizant of the role that discrimination played in shaping Hough: 
‘A major cause of this ghettoization has been racial prejudice and misunderstanding.’95  
Providing examples of blight and black activism in Hough, the Civil Rights Commission 
analyzed the Locher administration’s policy failures and the sluggish rate of urban 
renewal. The findings of 1966 Civil Rights Commission are supported by historians to 
elucidate the conditions in the ghetto, and the frustrated sentiments of its residents.  
Conclusion:  
Ironically, Mayor Locher was supposed to visit Hough on 19 July, the morning 
after the riots started. The visit had been scheduled following the Superior-Sowinski 
incident the previous month so that the out-of-touch Mayor could see for himself the 
conditions in the neighborhood.96 While Locher’s intentions were honest, his actions 
were too late. The seeds of racial discontent were sowed in Hough long before 1966.97 
Blacks in Cleveland had been treated like second-class citizens since the beginning of the 	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twentieth century. Despite the findings of the declension narrative, the residents of Hough 
had tried prior to the riots to improve the neighborhood through democratic channels to 
no avail. Following the example set in Watts the previous summer, the residents of 
Hough retaliated when confronted by the police outside the Seventy-Niner’s Café.  
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Chapter 2: Violence as a Form of Protest 
 
‘This isn’t Black Power talking. It is black frustration.’ 98 
 
 
Even though the Hough riots only lasted for one week in July of 1966, they 
embodied years of frustration in the neighborhood. The initial reaction of the Locher 
administration to the Hough riots was not to reconstruct the damaged community but 
rather to find out who caused the riots.99 The Special Grand Jury Report Relating to the 
Hough Riots was the government’s way to evade blame for the conditions in the 
neighborhood. The report attributed the violence to ‘black power apostle(s).’100 Praising 
the Grand Jury’s findings, Mayor Locher said the riots had absolutely no connection with 
the Civil Rights Movement. 101 Not only does this notion simplify the complex ideology 
of both movements, the Grand Jury Report effectively denied the longstanding nature and 
significance of the grievances felt in Hough.102 The citizens of Hough and local Civil 
Rights organizations were so indignant over the Grand Jury Report that they decided to 
issue their own report on the riots: The Report of the Panel on the Superior and Hough 
Disturbances by the Urban League of Cleveland. Deemed the ‘citizens’ report’ by local 
newspapers, the Urban League hearings were open to the public and chaired by people 
cognizant of the deplorable conditions in the neighborhood. 103 The Urban League Report 
was more representative of the sentiments of the Hough neighborhood than the Grand 
Jury Report. A proponent of the declension narrative, the Grand Jury Report concluded 
that the riots were an act of revolutionary violence promulgated by a small coalition of 
Black Power radicals. By disproving the findings of the Grand Jury Report, the Urban 
League Report demonstrated that the Hough riots were an articulate form of protest that 
drew attention to the conditions in the neighborhood.  	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The Grand Jury Report:  
The Special Grand Jury Report Relating to the Hough Riots was the government’s 
way to circumvent responsibility for its role in the deterioration of the neighborhood. 
Cleveland’s Grand Jury Report was similar to the conservative Commission on the 1965-
Watts riots. Both reports purported the riff-raff theory, which argued that only a small, 
degenerate segment of the neighborhood incited and participated in the riots.104 The riff-
raff theory was a way for the local government to escape culpability. If the government 
said the riots were a form of political expression, the government would have to blame 
themselves for not better responding to the plethora of previous calls for reform.105 The 
Locher administration was willing to go to extralegal means to escape liability. It was a 
direct violation of Ohio code to name perpetrators without sufficient evidence to indict.106  
One of the clubs cited in the report was the Jomo Freedom Kenyatta (JFK) House, a 
youth club in Hough. While the JFK House tried to cultivate a sense of black pride in the 
local youth, the club did not advocate violence.107  The founders of the JFK House 
described the Grand Jury investigation of the Hough riots as ‘a witch hunt seeking 
scapegoats for the troubles in Hough.’108 
The procedure and findings of the Grand Jury Report demonstrated how little 
Cleveland’s white power structure knew about the Hough community.109 Before the 
hearings began on 25 July, the fifteen members of the all-white jury, all of whom resided 
outside of Hough, took a fifty-minute bus tour of the neighborhood. Upon the jury’s 
return to the Criminal Courts Building, Grand Jury Foreman Louis Seltzer stated that the 
jurors had seen enough on their bus tour to realize ‘the violence was organized and 
planned.’110 The jurors believed that they only needed the testimony of one Hough 
teenager to substantiate Seltzer’s claims. This one teenager’s testimony trumpeted the 	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testimonies of two undercover agents, who had infiltrated the cited clubs and never heard 
any mention of riot planning.111 The jurors believed that the riot agitators were ‘black 
power apostle(s)’ because they were ‘avowed believers in violence and extremism.’112 
The JFK House, along with the Deacons for Defense, RAM and the Medgar Evers Rifle 
Club were cited in the report as the coordinators of the violence. The main witness said 
that he also saw members of the Community Youth Party and W.E.B. DuBois club from 
outside of Cleveland encouraging lawlessness in Hough a few days before the 
disorders.113 The local clubs and outside agitators had allegedly circulated 2,000 pieces of 
literature about police brutality on the eve of the riots.114 The Grand Jury found that these 
clubs had ‘a bitter hatred for all whites,’ and indoctrinated youths to their ‘philosophy of 
violence.’  These organizations purportedly supplied the rioters with arms, ammunition, 
and instructions on how to use Molotov cocktails. 115 
Despite an active black freedom movement in Cleveland, the Grand Jury denied 
the longstanding nature and significance of the grievances felt in Hough. In the preface to 
the Grand Jury Report, Seltzer wrote that the riots taking place throughout the country 
were the result of the ‘steady erosion of ideals and principles of God and Country and 
their persistent replacement by the deification of material idols and material 
principals.’ 116  This erosion was being accelerated by the notion that ‘the Negro 
Community was moving too fast for the total community to bear,’ implying that blacks in 
Hough should be content with their circumstances.117 The Locher administration was not 
ready to fulfill the basic rights of Cleveland’s black citizens. One Hough resident 
described the report as evidence that ‘the white adults in the big world outside the 
classroom have been busy proving that democracy is for whites. The leftover 
crumbs…are for Negroes.’ 118 	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Reinforcing the irreproachability of the Locher administration, the Grand Jury 
Report continually stressed that the majority of the neighborhood were ‘law-abiding 
citizens’ who did not partake in the violence.119 Not every single resident of Hough 
condoned the riots. The contemporary perception was that only teenagers were rioting.120 
Franklin Sanders, an unemployed father from Hough, condemned the youth violence for 
interrupting his daily routine: ‘Sure, I’d like a job. But you don’t solve nothing by 
burning everything down. These kids doing these thing don’t’ have to go to the store.’121 
The average age of the rioters, however, was twenty-five.122 Some of the people on the 
streets were simply taking advantage of the chaotic situation. 123 While the violence did 
alienate some members of the community, no resident of Hough was immune to the 
conditions in the neighborhood or the accompanying frustrations. Community Relations 
Director Bertram E. Gardner said ‘actually, the living conditions were the things that 
caused the riots. They (the rioters) didn’t need any Communists to tell them that they 
were suffering.’124  
The Urban League Report:  
Hough citizens and Civil Rights groups came together to explain the role that the 
frustrations played in the riots in The Report of the Panel on the Superior and Hough 
Disturbances by the Urban League of Cleveland. The Urban League Report was similar 
to the National Commission on the ‘long, hot summers,’ because both reports examined 
the actual sources of frustration in the ghetto instead of allocating blame. Local residents, 
Civil Rights and community leaders were so disappointed with the Grand Jury findings 
that they felt it was ‘their civic duty’ to hold their own hearings.125 The group included 
representatives from CORE, the Urban League, Hough Opportunity Council, the Council 
of Churches, the Negro Pastors Association, Wade Park Citizens Group and the National 
Association of Social Workers. Unlike the Grand Jury Hearings, organizations connected 	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with the neighborhood chaired the citizens’ panel hearings. 126 The report disputed the 
findings of the Grand Jury Report and spent the bulk of its pages detailing not only the 
conditions in the neighborhood, but also the thwarted political process as a cause of the 
riots.  
Protesting the squalor of the slums, the Hough riots attempted to highlight the 
racial subordination and segregation that had made the neighborhood a ghetto. 127 The 
rioters targeted the sources of black frustration in Hough: ‘The pattern of destruction on 
Hough Avenue seems to be a tangible expression of these feelings of exploitation.’ 128 
These targets included shops with a history of poor treatment of blacks, buildings 
associated with urban renewal and police officers.  Some historians refer to the ‘long, hot 
summers’ as commodity riots. 129 In other words, the rioters were re-appropriating the 
goods denied to them by the price-gauging white shop owners. 130 The shops attacked in 
Hough, like the Cut Rate Drug Store, were known for mistreating their black patrons 
either by not accepting food stamps or overcharging for sub-quality produce.131 The 
Urban League hearings confirmed ‘the well-known adage that “the poor pay more.”’132 
One citizen explained why he was partaking in the chaos: ‘It is the cheating by white 
merchants. People getting gypped all the time. High prices for relief people. The lousy 
credit buying.’133 The riots expressed the dissatisfaction with the economic inequality in 
Hough.  
  Additionally, Hough’s frustration over the sluggish rate of the University-Euclid 
Renewal Project was displayed during the riots. 134 Two of the buildings burned down 
were projects associated with urban renewal. One was an apartment building that was 
soon to be renovated to provide low-income housing for Hough families. The other 
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building was a recreational center that had been recently renovated.135 All of Cleveland’s 
news media questioned why the rioters would want to cause further damage to the 
already deteriorating neighborhood.  There were three main Cleveland newspapers in the 
1960’s: The Plain Dealer, The Cleveland Press and the black newspaper The Call and 
Post. Advocates of the declension narrative, these news outlets played an active role in 
pandering to readers in order to sell their publication.136  Even though all of the Cleveland 
newspapers indicated that urban renewal was a source of frustration in the neighborhood, 
the riots were portrayed as senseless.137 While the riots did cause further damage to the 
neighborhood, urban renewal was described in the Urban League Report as also 
‘contributing to the decline of the areas and of creating new slums where none previously 
existed.’138 The riots were simply drawing attention to the failure of the University-
Euclid Renewal Plan: ‘It is not entirely coincidental that much of the destruction during 
the riots centered on dilapidated buildings that the city had failed to demolish.’139 The 
University-Euclid Renewal Plan had failed to improve the conditions in Hough. So the 
rioters chose to hasten the neighborhood’s decline on their own by attacking the police 
officers who tried to thwart the destruction.  (See Appendix B).  
The recurring instances of police misconduct and brutality were another cause of 
the Hough riots.140 Residents of Hough saw themselves as victims of inadequate police 
protection.141 The police symbolized the city government in Hough.142 The scarcity of 
black police officers played a crucial role in shaping white officers attitudes and in 
delegitimizing law enforcement in the eyes of blacks. 143 In the Cleveland Police force, 
there were only 183 black officers out of a total of 2754 officers.144 Police took longer to 
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respond to calls in Hough than in other parts of Cleveland even though the neighborhood 
had the highest crime rate in the entire city. 145 Because of the segregated nature of the 
city, the only interaction that the majority of Cleveland’s police officers had with blacks 
was in relation to the illegal economy.146 Evidenced by their conduct during the riots, the 
police assumed that all blacks had criminal proclivities.  
The Cleveland Police’s racist assumptions about the citizens of Hough were 
demonstrated during the riots. Effectively denying the role the police played in the riots, 
the Grand Jury Report commended the actions of the Cleveland Police Department and 
National Guard in the riot.147 Many officers were overly aggressive even with Hough 
citizens who were not partaking in the violence:  
‘The tenants wanted to know why policeman kicked in doors, broke up furniture 
and chased defenseless women and children in the safe confines of their home, into the 
street to face bricks, bottles, bullets and down-pouring range…All tenants said police 
used epithets in speaking to them.’148  
 
The Urban League Report asked for the Grand Jury to investigate the shooting of the 
Townes Family, and the deaths of Joyce Arnett and Percy Giles.149 The Townes Family 
was trying to leave their home in Hough after a fire started in an adjacent building. 
Previous reports said that Mr. Townes was trying to run over police officers, which 
prompted the police to fire into the family’s car. The car lurched forward, because the 
police were pulling and striking Mr. Townes, causing him to lose control of the vehicle. 
As a result of the shooting, members of the Townes family received permanent injuries 
that handicapped them for life.150 Unidentified snipers reportedly shot Percy Giles and 
Joyce Arnett, but the Urban League Report believed that it could have been police 
officers that killed these two Hough residents.151  The news media, the Grand Jury Report 
and subsequently the declension narrative failed to reveal the numerous acts of injustice 
experienced by the residents of Hough.  	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Conclusion: 
One Hough resident described the ultimate aim of the riots: ‘In the end, the white 
man will recognize Negroes and give us consideration.’ However articulate, the riots 
failed to change the sentiments of the Locher administration. The Grand Jury Report and 
the declension narrative did not view what happened in Hough as a form of protest, or to 
have any relation with the aims of the Civil Rights Movement. Instead of admitting its 
responsibility for the conditions in Hough, the Locher administration believed that the 
racial turbulence was caused by Black Power radicals who wanted to usurp the 
neighborhood. The Urban League Report demonstrated that the rioters hoped to draw 
attention to the deteriorating conditions in Hough. Discriminatory shops, buildings 
associated with urban renewal and police officers were targeted, because they symbolized 
the role that racial subordination and segregation had played in the deterioration of 
Hough. While instructive, the Urban League Report had no ability to enact reform, and 
could only urge the Locher administration to take constructive action in Hough. The 
Cleveland Press’ Editorial Board was fearful that City Hall’s disregard of the conditions 
in the Hough would spark another riot: ‘Because once the community assigns the Hough 
looting, shooting, burning and general hell raising to a travelling band from Havana or 
Peking, the door will be open for another riot.’152 Cleveland’s black community had other 
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Chapter 3: Cleveland’s First Black Mayor 	  
While the riots may have stopped on 23 July, 1966, the citizens of Hough did not 
give up their efforts to improve the neighborhood. The conditions in Hough remained 
dire after the riots. Hough, as one journalist described, was literally ‘going out of 
business.’153 Despite the recommendations of the Urban League Report, the Locher 
administration made no substantive policy changes. 154 Locher’s ineptitude demonstrated 
to Cleveland’s black community that the only way to improve Hough was if they elected 
a mayor who was sympathetic to the plight of the neighborhood.155 State Representative 
Carl Stokes was viewed as the ideal candidate to represent Hough’s interests in City Hall, 
because he was an African-American man born in the Cleveland housing projects. 
Spurred by the riots, Cleveland’s black community secured Stokes’ 1967 victory in an 
unprecedented voter turnout.156  Stokes’ opponents tried to use Stokes’ race to deter white 
voters. Regardless, the white community viewed Stokes’ race as an asset; he was the only 
candidate who could prevent any further racial unrest.157 The predicament of the Hough 
neighborhood played a critical role in the 1967 mayoral election. Cleveland realized that 
the only way to achieve lasting peace in Hough was to elect Carl Stokes as the first black 
mayor of a major American city. The post-riot period proved that the Civil Rights 
Movement did not end with the riots nor was the movement completely separate from 
Black Power ideology: the black community in Cleveland used self-determination to 
improve the conditions in Hough after the riots had failed to prompt Mayor Locher to 
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Mayor Locher’s Political Demise:  
The post-riot period demonstrated Mayor Locher’s political incompetence as his 
administration continued to neglect the Hough neighborhood. The Locher administration 
made no effort to help or even clean up the neighborhood. Five months after the riots, 
residents of Hough said that the conditions were as bad as they were before the riots. The 
empty shells of the burned buildings were a daily reminder of the lack of progress.158  
Unemployment rates in Hough continued to be the highest in the city, and welfare 
payments in Hough remained below the poverty line. The Police Department made no 
effort to hire more black police officers in 1967.159 Reverend Friar Albert Koklowski 
summarized the general feeling in Hough toward the Locher administration: ‘We are 
moving too slowly. We’re crawling when we should be running. City Hall’s apathy is the 
main problem.’160 This sentiment was even echoed by the Mayor’s Inner-City Action 
Committee. Locher created the task force of civic and community leaders to help improve 
the sluggish urban renewal program. The task force polled local residents of the 
community and presented its report in January of 1967. The Chairman of the Committee, 
Ralph M. Beese, said that ‘conditions in Hough are awful…the core of the problem is at 
City Hall.’161  Locher responded to the committee’s report by promising to build more 
recreational facilities in Hough, another project that would never come to fruition.  In the 
summer of 1967, the Department of Housing and Urban Development froze the City’s 
urban renewal funds and withdrew an additional $10 million committed to downtown 
commercial development, because the city had failed to complete a single urban renewal 
project.162 Many observers predicted that there would be another riot during the summer 
of 1967 because of Locher’s insensitivity to the needs of Hough.163 Since riots and 
previous calls for reform had failed to spur the Locher administration, Cleveland’s black 
community resorted to an alternative method to improve the conditions in Hough. Locher 
lost the 1967 mayoral election, because he was unresponsive to the needs of the ghetto. 	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The Election of Carl Stokes:  
The post-riot period showed that Hough would only improve if black interests 
became a priority in City Hall. The aftermath of the riots served to heighten group 
consciousness, cohesion and a growing sense of group power amongst Cleveland blacks. 
Mr. Perry said that ’the riots unified the black community…what happened in Hough 
permeated throughout our community.’164 The 1967 Carl Stokes campaign was cognizant 
of this attitude change amongst Cleveland’s black community and sold Stokes’ 
‘blackness’ in numerous voter registration drives in Hough.  One campaign worker said: 
‘We tried to convince people that this was their opportunity to vote for a brother and 
make him mayor of the city.’ 165166 State Representative Carl Stokes was born in 
Cleveland and grew up in the Outhwaite Homes, Cleveland’s first federally funded 
housing project.167 His reliability was precisely his appeal to blacks voters like George 
Smith, a resident of Cleveland during the 1960’s: ‘He was one of us. He was from the 
projects.’168 It was not simply his race that made Stokes appeal to the African-American 
community. During the Civil Rights Commission, Stokes was propelled into the national 
spotlight as one of the main voices combatting urban poverty.169 Stokes also publicly 
condemned the Grand Jury Report and Mayor Locher for ‘sweeping the city’s mistakes 
under the rug. 170 Throughout his campaign, Stokes promised to revitalize Hough by 
increasing funding for housing, education, health and welfare.171  Additionally, Stokes 
promised to integrate the police department and to improve the city’s urban renewal 
program. 172 Stokes won the black vote, because he was affective at articulating the needs 
of the Hough community that had been continually ignored by Mayor Locher. 173 
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Carl Stokes was able to become the first African-American mayor of a major 
American city because the Hough riots solidified the black community’s opposition to 
politics as usual.174 This change is demonstrated by comparing Stokes’ election results in 
1965 to his victory in 1967. Carl Stokes lost to Mayor Locher by less than 1% in 1965, a 
loss that was attributed to low turnout in the black wards. The election of Carl Stokes in 
1967 was the highest voter turnout in Cleveland’s black wards. 175  95% of the 
predominately black wards voted for Stokes in both the Democratic primary and general 
election. Even the more radical black political groups in Cleveland agreed to tone down 
their rhetoric during the Stokes’ campaign, because the activists believed a Stokes’ 
administration would make a concerted effort to improve the conditions in the 
neighborhood.176  
Stokes convinced whites in Cleveland that he was the only candidate who could 
keep the lid on racial unrest. 177 In order to the win the election, Stokes had to win over 
both black and white voters.  Mr. Smith believed Carl Stokes was able to win the election 
because ‘he was able to crossover. He was like Michael Jackson, he appealed to 
everybody.’178 Carl Stokes had two opponents during the 1967 election: Mayor Locher in 
the Democratic primary and Republican, Seth Taft in the general election. Both Locher 
and Taft tried to use Stokes’ race to fuel fear amongst white voters.179 The Locher 
campaign printed out flyers to demonstrate the major role that the radical Martin Luther 
King Jr. would play in the Stokes’ administration. ‘Dictatorship in Cleveland: Previews 
of Stokes and MLK as Mayor. Do you want MLK and his disciples running your city?’180 
Supporters of Taft circulated an anonymous pamphlet the day before the election that 
negatively equated Stokes with Black Power and the end of racial segregation: ‘Stokes is 
Black Power. Vote White- Vote Right. You can rest assured that if Stokes is elected 
Mayor of Cleveland you will get negroes for neighbors and your children will have 	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niggers for playmates.’181 The Locher and Taft campaigns only further augmented the 
black community’s support of Stokes, who wanted to end the racism in City Hall. One 
Hough supporter said: ‘I don’t want to see Cleveland face that again…Stokes knows the 
black man’s problems.’ 182 It was precisely Stokes’ connection with the black community 
that helped him garner the 20% of the white vote necessary to win the election.183 Stokes 
used his race as a form of riot insurance. Mr. Perry argued that ‘the white community felt 
that if we (African-Americans) got a good chief, we would follow.’184 Regardless of race, 
Stokes’ supporters hoped that his 1967 victory would increase the effectiveness of 
Cleveland’s municipal government.  
Conclusion:  
The election of Carl Stokes in 1967 disproves the declension narrative by 
embodying both the multi-faceted nature of Black Power and the continuation of the 
Civil Rights Movement after the Hough riots. Although articulate, the riots had failed to 
engender the necessary improvements in Hough. The problem did not stem from a lack of 
awareness about the conditions in the neighborhood rather from City Hall’s apathy. The 
mayor made no effort to stop the further deterioration of Hough. This proved to 
Cleveland’s black community that no form of protest could change Locher’s racist 
sentiments, and many speculated that there would be more riots in Hough. Blacks in 
Cleveland had not given up on their goal to spur reform in Hough; they simply decided to 
try a new tactic.  The African-American community drew on the Black Power notion of 
self-determination to oust Locher in favor of Carl Stokes, who became the first black 
mayor of a major American city in 1967. Even though his opponents tried to use his race 
against him, Stokes won the election because of his relationship with Cleveland’s black 
community. To prevent any further racial unrest, Stokes promised to make black issues a 
priority in City Hall. The 1967 election was uplifting for the Hough community. Stokes’ 
ascension to City Hall meant the end of a decade’s worth of frustration in Hough: ‘In the 
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heart of the Negro Ghetto, Carl Stokes is more than just the new mayor. He is 
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Conclusion: 
 
Malcolm X and Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. are often depicted in the 
declension narrative as the face of two contrasting ideologies: Black Power and Civil 
Rights respectively.186 It is crucial to analyze two, separate speeches these leaders made 
in Cleveland pertaining to the Hough riots in order to illustrate the inaccuracies of the 
narrative’s timeline and interpretations of the ‘long, hot summers.’ Malcolm made his 
famous  ‘The Ballot or the Bullet’ speech at the Cory Methodist Church in Cleveland in 
1964, in which he predicted that the riots would be the result of a thwarted political 
process. 187  Malcolm X espoused an ideology of Black Power even before the Watts riots 
in 1965. Yet in this particular speech, Malcolm talked about many of the same themes 
that the declension narrative associates with the nonviolent Civil Rights Movement such 
as voting rights. While Malcolm urged blacks in Cleveland to exercise their right to vote, 
he cautioned what would happen if the government continued to deny black’s full 
equality:  
 ‘So today, our people are disillusioned. They’ve become disenchanted. They’ve 
become dissatisfied. And in their frustrations they want action. And in 1964 you’ll see 
this young black man, this new generation, asking for the ballot or the bullet.’ 188  
 
Malcolm X failed to foresee that Hough would ultimately chose the ballot, after the bullet 
failed to usher in any substantive improvements to the neighborhood. 
As evidenced by his 1967 speech for the Stokes’ campaign, King continued to 
champion Civil Rights after the riots, with nuances in his viewpoints. 189 King was 
advocating for self-determination, a principal commonly associated with the teachings of 
Malcolm X. While condemning the riots, King urged African-Americans to exercise their 
voting power and to improve their lot by electing a black mayor:  
‘Our power does not lie in Molotov cocktails… Our power lies in our ability to 
unite around concrete programs. Our power lies in our ability to say nonviolently that we 
aren’t going to take it any longer…one of the things that we need in every city is political 	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power.’190  
 
After the failure of the riots, Cleveland’s black community followed King’s advice and 
elected Carl Stokes, because he promised to improve the conditions in Hough.  Lacking 
proper source analysis, the declension narrative fails to account for the complexity of 
activism in Cleveland’s ghetto. The people of Hough went from ballot to bullet but 
ultimately decided to return to the ballot in an effort to improve the conditions in their 
neighborhood.   
This dissertation endeavored to analyze the causes behind and subsequent 
aftermath of the Hough riots to disprove the declension narrative’s placement and 
portrayal of the ‘long, hot summer’ riots. The narrative posits that the riots were the 
beginning of black activism in the North. The first chapter illustrated that Cleveland was 
a crucible of black activism before the riots to combat the horrible conditions in the 
ghetto. Civil Rights and Black Power groups worked together in an attempt to enforce 
housing codes, improve local schools, increase welfare funding and end police brutality. 
Despite the activist’s effort to ameliorate Hough, their concerns were not enacted upon by 
City Hall. Mayor Ralph Locher did not understand the plight of Hough citizens, and his 
administration failed to uphold the promises made to the neighborhood regarding urban 
renewal. The Hough riots were the result of a thwarted political process; residents of 
Hough chose to protest by rioting because they had no other viable strategy for change.  
The second chapter aimed to refute the declension narrative’s notion that the riots 
were an example of revolutionary violence by comparing the Grand Jury and Urban 
League Reports on the Hough riots. The Urban League Report was more representative 
of the sentiments of the Hough community than the findings of the Grand Jury Report. 
The Urban League Report illustrated that the riots were an articulate form of expression 
to garner the public’s attention about the deterioration of the neighborhood. The Locher 
administration’s response to the week of violence demonstrated that City Hall failed to 
grasp the meaning of the riots. The Grand Jury Report blamed the riots on Black Power 
agitators, so the municipal government could circumvent responsibility for their role in 
the deterioration of the neighborhood. The Locher administration effectively denied the 
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longstanding nature and significance of the grievances felt in Hough. While some 
believed this denial would spark another riot in the neighborhood, the residents of Hough 
resorted to a new tactic to improve the conditions in their community.  
The third chapter analyzed the post-riot period to prove that the Civil Rights 
Movement did not end with the riots, nor was the Civil Rights Movement completely 
separate from Black Power ideology as purported by the declension narrative. Although 
the Hough riots failed to achieve their ultimate goal of reform, they encouraged a sense of 
group consciousness and unity amongst blacks in Cleveland. African-American’s realized 
that the only way to ensure the improvement of Hough was through self-determination, 
which could be achieved by electing Carl Stokes. Stokes won the 1967 election because 
he promised to represent black interests in City Hall, and to prevent further racial unrest. 
Ultimately, this dissertation aimed to prove that the Hough riots were at the intersection 
of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements, and drew upon both tactics to improve 
the conditions in the neighborhood.  
 
Epilogue: What happened to Hough after Carl Stokes was elected? 
The election of Carl Stokes in 1967 was meant to represent the ultimate 
fulfillment of the aims of the Hough riots. Stokes failed to prevent another riot. He and 
the following six mayors of Cleveland, two of who are also African-American, failed to 
improve the conditions in Hough. The period from 1967 until the present demonstrate 
that the Hough riots failed to ever incite lasting reform in Hough. In 1968, black 
nationalists in the adjacent neighborhood of Glenville had a shoot-out with the police, 
which resulted in the death of seven citizens. The Stokes’ administration became mired in 
scandal when it was discovered that Ahmed Evans, leader of the black nationalists in 
Glenville, had received money from Stokes' Cleveland Now Foundation to start his 
radical organization.191 Evans and his associates were essentially a band of hoodlums 
who used black nationalism to cement their position as the reigning gang of the 
neighborhood.  
  The election of Carl Stokes did not stop the exodus out of Hough. 1967 was the 
first year in the twentieth-century when the population in Hough began to decline, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Miller and Wheeler, ‘Cleveland’ in Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader, p. 44. 
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the process never stopped. The population in Hough went from 71,575 in 1960 to 14,618 
in 1980.192 Mr. Smith sardonically surmised the demographic change that took place in 
Hough: 'When the whites move out...the blacks move in. When the blacks move out, the 
wrecking ball moves in.' 193 Nick Savmor, owner of the Pick N Pay Supermarket, was 
able to survive the riots despite his unpopularity with local black residents. He was 
unable to survive the cancellation of his insurance plan. White owned insurance 
companies were hesitant to write insurance plans for businesses in Hough following the 
riots.194 Mr. Perry and his insurance company were one of the few to profit from the 
exodus out of Hough.  As white businesses moved out, black businesses began to take 
their place and the Pinkney-Perry Company wrote their insurance policies.195 This golden 
era of a black-run neighborhood was short lived as it became easier for African-
Americans to move into Cleveland’s suburbs.  By the 1980s, there was not even a 
laundromat in Hough. A local resident described how life in Hough in the 1980s was 
worse off than before the riots: ‘The biggest difference from 1966 until now is that there 
is nothing here no more, no businesses.’196 
Despite the local activists’ valiant efforts to improve the conditions in Hough, the 
problems they faced in 1966 are still prevalent today. Hough is currently a peculiar 
mélange of boarded up houses, vacant lots and large prefabricated homes. These homes 
were built as a part of a tax incentive to encourage people to leave the suburbs and move 
back into the city. The gentrified portion of the neighborhood is located on the side of 
Hough adjacent to the world famous Cleveland Clinic Hospital, the same portion of the 
neighborhood designated for renewal by the University-Euclid Plan in the 1960’s. These 
suburban-esque homes serve as a façade to mask the rest of Hough’s poverty and 
desolation. The only evidence that a riot occurred in the neighborhood is a small 
memorial at the corner of 79th and Hough Avenue. An obelisk and plaque stand opposite 
to the lot where the Seventy-Niner’s Café used to be. Formerly the center of the 
neighborhood, the place where the 1966 riots started is presently an overgrown, vacant 	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196 ‘Isolated,’ The Plain Dealer (14 September, 1980).	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lot. At the corner of 79th and Hough, in a strange twist of fate, the riots are staring their 
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Appendix A:  	  	  	  	  
	  
 Fig.	  1:	  Map	  of	  Cleveland,	  Marc Lackwritz, ‘The Hough Riots of 1966,’ (Senior 
Thesis, Princeton University, 1968).	  
	  
Fig.	  2:	  Photo	  of	  crowd	  during	  the1966 
Hough riots, Courtesy 
of Cleveland Public 
Library’s Digital 
Gallery. 	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Appendix B:  
 
	  
Fig. 3:Photo of Cut Rate Drug Store during the 1966 Hough riots, Courtesy of Cleveland 






Fig. 4: Photo of apartment building during the 1966 Hough Riots, Courtesy of 
Cleveland Public Library’s Digital Gallery. 	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